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Fifty years ago Morse Peckham
1
 concluded his review of Darwin’s impact on 
humanities with a rhetorical question: “Is it true that what Darwin said had very little impact, 
but that what people thought he said, that is, what they already believed and believed to have 
been confirmed by Darwin, had an enormous impact?” With respect to the ethical 
implications of the Darwinian revolution, the answer is a resounding yes. While the 
ideological reception of Darwin’s discoveries has been dominated and biased by the ghost of 
social Darwinism, the genuine ethical implications of evolution have been overlooked and, to 
some extent, deliberately ignored in order to avoid a confrontation with the traditional, 
unconditional anthropocentrism, in particular in its religious rendition. 150 years after the 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, one of the most revealing scientific works 
ever, it is precisely this conflict with humans’ sense of self-importance that explains the 
enduring strength of irrational opposition to the acceptance of the natural, evolutionary origins 
of Homo sapiens
2
, the theory of natural selection, and even the very fact of evolution. 
However, while the denial of evolution is generally recognized as religion’s frontal attack on 
science and a serious threat to Western civilization,  the questioning of the evolutionary origin 
of the human psyche or the whole of human nature seems to be tolerated even in academia, as 
if a suprantaural intervention in the evolution of one primate were more acceptable than, for 
example, in the origin of life even though the theory of biogenesis still poses serious problems 
while that of anthropogenesis does not. 
Darwin’S discovery of the natural origins of all life forms3 including humans4, has 
always had far-reaching but poorly known ethical consequences, both normative and meta-
ethical. The direct normative implications relate to the permissible ways of treating non-
human subjects because of the evolutionary continuity of human and non-human value-laden 
experience
5
 and thus the commonality of some so-called extra-moral values that are dealt with 
by the motivational system known as moral agency. The main meta-ethical implication of 
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evolution by natural selection is the abolition of the grounds for the justification of any norms 
by any received, evolved and in that sense natural (moral) order, since neither biological nor 
biocultural evolution is ethical. This meta-ethical consequence has straightforward normative 
implications inasmuch as it removes grounds to some injunctions that are followed mainly or 
exclusively because of the religious or lay tradition. 
 
THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EVOLUTION BY NATURAL SELECTION 
Ever since David Hume it has been recognized that ought does not follow from is, that is, no 
ethical norm can be justified by what has been in existence so far (“no ought from is”). 
However, as long as the world was believed to be a divine creation, Hume’s rule was limited 
essentially to the free will that humans were endowed with in order to have the choice to obey 
God or go astray and be judged accordingly. If nature were part of divine creation but devoid 
of free will, then the natural order could be expected to carry a moral message, hence the 
program of natural theology of studying nature for the sake of understanding God’s work. 
Darwin grew up with such a world view and ultimately destroyed it by replacing God with 
natural selection as the powerful generator of biodiversity that has no purpose and thus no 
ethical design, but does have ethical implications. 
Unfortunately, except for Darwin himself, the ethical implications of evolution were 
misunderstood and/or misrepresented from the very beginning. Thomas Huxley, acting as 
“Darwin’s bulldog”, contradicted Darwin by rejecting any ethical implications of evolution 
and thus denied any moral status to nonhuman world. The Huxleyan “veneer” model of 
morals
6
 as a thin layer superimposed on an ethically meaningless and worthless brute nature 
was readily embraced by Judaeo-Christian religions and is still widespread in the public 
sphere, including many members of academia. On the other hand, the deeply entrenched 
notion of deriving moral order from nature yielded social Darwinism. It was an eclectic, 
popular doctrine that promoted “the survival of the fittest” at the expense of the weak and 
poor as an ethical justification of ruthless 19
th
 century capitalism. In fact, no such justification 
can possibly follow from the theory of natural selection nor from any other theory of 
evolution which, as every scientific explanation, is about what is and not about what should 
be. Contrary to its name, social Darwinism was inspired mainly by the philosophy of Herbert 
Spencer rather than Darwin’s theory. Spencer thought that all of the living world, including 
human societies, is ruled by the same laws that, in a nutshell, ensure progress, the thriving of 
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life, and happiness. Spencerian theory is Lamarckian rather than Darwinian
7
, as individual 
success in a society depends on the motivation to avoid poverty, which encourages anti-
humanitarian attitudes that follow from reasoning of the sort that those who do not care about 
their future deserve failure. Spencer’s attempts to derive ethics from his universal 
evolutionism evoked a massive response from E. G. Moore who argued that goodness is a 
simple quality or entity, an elementary term, not amenable to a definition or analysis, and that 
defining goodness in terms of empirical sciences commits the naturalistic fallacy
8
. However, 
values are definable in scientific terms
9
 even if they are not knowable without introspection 
and, as some philosophers have opined, Moore’s naturalistic fallacy may come down to the 
violation of Hume’s rule that has gained, under a new name, more significance owing to 
Moore’s influence. Whatever the status of the naturalistic fallacy, Moore’s philosophy 
discredited all social Darwinist-style justifications of ethical norms by emulation of the 
mechanisms and/or outcomes of evolution. Unfortunately, it also committed the error of 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater by cutting off the whole of ethics (including meta-
ethics) from science
10
, and thus legitimizing the moralistic fallacy, that is, the notion that 
morality is inherently good. 
Darwin as a scientist thought that the progress of civilization was dependent on a 
weakened form of selection within human societies as well as between races and nations. This 
view was part of his scientific theory. However, as a moral agent capable of ethical reflection, 
Darwin
11
 acknowledged the obligation to minimize the ethical cost of progress: “Darwin 
hoped that the ‘weaker and inferior’ will marry less frequently to help ‘check’ this 
enfeeblement of society. But, ever a humanitarian, he still declared that we must bear the 
consequences of the weak surviving ‘without complaining’. Indeed to curtail ‘the aid which 
we feel impelled to give to the helpless’ would no less cause a ‘deterioration in the noblest 
part of our nature’”12. Darwin was compassionate towards slaves, which is what motivated 
him, according to Desmond i Moore
13
, to write The Descent of Man where he called slavery 
“a great crime”14. In the same book, Darwin also showed compassion towards animals by 
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referring to the pleasure that some savages derive from tormenting animals as “horrid”15. 
Darwin also found time to pen “a heart-felt ....plea against leg-hold traps”16 as an extremely 
inhumane technique that causes excruciating pain. Actually, Darwin is quite explicit about his 
ethical attitude toward animals, stating that “sympathy beyond the confines of man, that is, 
humanity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest moral acquisitions” and goes on 
calling humaneness one of the noblest virtues “with which man is endowed” and which 
“seems to arise incidentally from our sympathies becoming more tender and more widely 
diffused, until they extend to all sentient beings”17 (emphasis added).  
The precept of respect for both human and nonhuman wellbeing exemplifies Darwin’s 
normative ethics, scientifically informed by the evolutionary continuity of emotional 
experience between all humans and nonhumans
18
 as well as consistent with the evolutionary 
origin of morality as initiated by sympathy
19
. In this light, the popular association of 
Darwinism with the social Darwinist ethics of ruthlessness is entirely groundless. True 
Darwinian ethics commands respect for the welfare of all sentient beings, whether human or 
not, thereby laying ground for the recent expansion of the circle of ethical concerns beyond 
our own species. 
Likewise assaults on sociobiology, based on its social Darwinist interpretations, are 
unfounded. Ironically, while social Darwinism commits the naturalistic fallacy, the social 
Darwinist interpretations of sociobiology make a patently false assumption that itself commits 
the naturalistic fallacy. The false assumption (itself called moralistic fallacy) is that morality 
(or the whole of human nature) is good by definition, hence an explanation of an ethically 
wrong behaviour  (e.g., infanticide) as part of morality legitimizes this behaviour. In fact, 
every received morality is an outcome of biocultural evolution and as such has flaws that are 
subject to ethical corrections. However, the received flaws can be effectively corrected only if 
properly understood as the outcomes of evolution rather than pathologies or the work of 
Satan. To name the largest scale problems, reciprocity and kin selection explain the origin of 
preferences for, respectively, one’s own group and one’s own family20, which are common to 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, p. 118. 
16
 C. Darwin, Vermin and traps. Garderner’s Chronicle and Agricultural Gazette 1863, no. 35 (29 August), p. 
821-822. 
17
 C. Darwin, The Descent .... 
18
 C. Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3
rd
 ed., Oxford University Press, New York 
Oxford 1998 (1
st
 ed. Murray, London 1972)  
19
 C. Darwin, The Descent .... 
20
 R. D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine de Gruyter, New York 1987; J. Alcock, The Triumph 
of Sociobiology. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001. 
 6 
all received morals but have the well known destructive potential for discrimination and 
nepotism. 
Unfortunately, individual biologists who happen to extemporize on ethical subjects, as 
well as other people with “naturalistic” and “ecologistic” attitudes21, every so often commit 
the naturalistic fallacy (of which they are usually unaware), and sometimes express outright 
social Darwinist views. This may well be an objective reason for the lasting fear of social 
Darwinism a century after it was discredited. The paramount misunderstandings surrounding 
the ethical meaning of evolution reveal a pressing need for an obligatory course of ethics in 
biology curricula that, in order to be effective, should be taught with a due understanding of 
evolutionary biology as well as cognitive animal psychology. The need is pressing as many 
biologists use vertebrates in their research with very little awareness of the evolutionary 
continuity of emotional experience as a source of our common vertebrate values
22
. 
 
THE EVOLUTIONARY ORGINS OF MORALITY 
Despite a high-profile, dogmatic opposition to any scientific study of morality
23
, 
which certainly does not help to obtain funding for research that is aimed at understanding 
ourselves as humans, significant progress has been achieved in the study of the moral agency 
in humans and other hominids including its brain substrates
24
, motivational mechanisms 
25
, 
ontogenetic development
26
 as well as its evolutionary origins
27
. The resulting overall picture 
of moral agency is that of an innate mechanism operating primarily at the experiential rather 
than rational level of consciousness
28
 and using ready, modal emotional reactions to (one’s 
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own or others’) intentional actions. Today’s science tends to agree with the Humean theories 
of moral sentiments as innate elements of human nature,  rather than the Kantian moral 
rationalism. The latter is applicable to the domain of ethical reflection that can at the most 
modulate rather than generate a moral judgment. 
 
Reciprocity as the cornerstone of morality 
While Westermarck
29
 recognized morality as the work of “retributive emotions“ (both 
punishing and rewarding), it was only following Gouldner’s milestone paper30 and the decline 
of behaviourism and cultural relativism that reciprocity has become broadly accepted as a 
universal principle of human morality
31
. Remarkably consilient in this respect is the picture 
which emerges from studies of the individual (ontogenetic) development of moral reasoning
32
 
(Table 1). This research is based on verbal evaluations of imaginary moral dilemmas 
(originally that of Heinz who stole a medicine to save his dying wife because he could not 
afford to buy it) and has been criticized for its cognitive bias, but this gives even more weight 
to the consilience of its results with those of social psychology and neurobiology. 
The first stage of human moral development is identified in small children who obey 
whoever is big and powerful in order to avoid punishment and follow momentary desires to 
get pleasure. Every cat or dog would be scored at that stage if she/he could report on her/his 
motivation but the motivation at this stage is not really moral as it does not consider anybody 
else’s wellbeing or, as Gibbs33 concedes, at this stage morality is “confused with egocentric 
biases and motives”. So why is it consistently, ever since Jean Piaget, adduced as the first 
stage of moral development? It is because it brings about the apperception of basic, the so-
called extra-moral values, that is, everything that feels good or bad no matter what anybody 
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else thinks about it. Those are the ultimate existential values
34
 that are traded at higher stages 
of moral development. There would be no morals without basic or “extra-moral” values35 and 
their apperception early on in life. The very term “extra-moral” for basic values reflects the 
traditional idealistic bias of ethical thought that suffered from its programmatic detachment 
from science. 
Moral agency appears at the second stage or the stage of bilateral (dyadic) pragmatic 
exchanges. This is the stage of direct immediate reciprocity, with partners considering each 
other’s interests only for the sake of gaining concrete expected benefits (“do for others as they 
did and will do for you”). Some adult humans may remain at this stage but most of them reach 
the third stage, the stage of good interpersonal relationships or mutualities, and pay attention 
to ideal reciprocity and potential interactions within their group by building mutual trust. The 
third party perspective appears at this stage together with the Golden Rule (“do for others as 
you would be done by them”). The fourth stage, the last stage of standard moral development, 
features the importance of fulfilling one’s duties and maintaining the social order with its 
institutions that all guarantee beneficial exchange of services.  
Thus cross-cultural studies of the development of moral thinking confirm reciprocity 
as the organizing principle of an average human morality. At the mature stages 3 and 4 of 
moral development, reciprocity is executed in the Humean triad in which a spectator (an 
arbiter) that can be internal (conscience) or external (a third party) attributes responsibility to 
either an agent (or actor) or a receiver. This evokes a modal, negative or positive emotion that 
motivates a retributive or rewarding action or attitude, e.g., a moralizing aggression that is 
motivated by an agent’s malicious deed. The third party as an arbiter, a distinctive feature of 
human moral agency
36
, may implement “moralistic blueprints” of a group and serve as the 
“leading moralist” to admonish or reprimand potential or actual deviants37. The enforcement 
of common standards by a third party intervention clearly strengthens group cohesion but also 
opens up a way for imposing behaviours that do not serve either the group or its members, 
and may actually prove destructive to them. This often seems to be the case with the massive 
intervention of religions that use institutionalized “leading moralists” to manipulate innate 
moral agency to execute the virtual reciprocity between believers and their god(s). In 
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exchange for the benefits (in fact the outcomes of evolution, human work or coincidence) that 
are portrayed as god’s great gifts, a clergyman acting on behalf of this god can essentially 
make any demands even if they are evidently destructive for the believers (e.g., not using 
condoms despite the epidemic of AIDS). 
As once observed by Westermarck
38
, both the moral significance of reason and the 
role of moral motivation in the life of an average human are widely overestimated. The 
quoted research on development of moral reasoning
39
 demonstrated that the level of 
universalizing ethical reflections (Kantian or otherwise, depending on culture) is reached by a 
low percentage of humans. Only a small minority of people think about the justification of 
their moral norms (and those westerners who do commonly end up with some sort of 
contractualism which is a doctrine of reciprocity) and even less people apply any truly 
universalizing ethics. The majority of humans are moral but not ethical apes. 
Reciprocity evolved in many social vertebrates long before moral agency. The origin 
of reciprocity has been explained by sociobiology under the rather unfortunate name of 
reciprocal altruism
40
 which diverted part of the discussion to the moot idea of altruism. 
Reciprocal altruism can possibly be mediated by various behavioural mechanisms that remain 
unknown (including the classic case of reciprocal altruism in the vampire bats Desmodus 
rotundus). In any case, reciprocal altruism alone does not imply any moral motivation to 
enforce reciprocity. Moral agency, as we are starting to understand it in primates, is a 
complex psychological mechanism that results from the assembly of several affective and 
cognitive abilities, in particular empathy (or affective role taking) and responsibility 
attribution.  Some insights into the evolution of these faculties have recently been gained by 
the combined effort of social and personality psychology of humans and other primates
41
. 
 
 
 
Early evolution of morality 
In the book that demolished religious mythology about the origins of Homo sapiens, 
Darwin hypothesized that morality originated from “social instincts”, primarily from 
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“sympathy with individuals of the same group”42. Darwin was right once again and in a 
double sense: he identified morality as an intragroup phenomenon and the ability to 
sympathize with others as the first step or at least a necessary condition for its evolutionary 
origin. In fact, the moral role of sympathy was well understood before by Adam Smith, whom 
Darwin quotes. The concept of empathy was introduced much later as a translation of  
Einfühlung, and today means active affective role taking43 that is effected by mirror neurons44. 
Aside from inevitable differences in psychological definitions, both Smith and Darwin had a 
remarkably good understanding of what is meant today by empathy. 
Empathy was the key innovation in the evolution of moral agency. Moral agency 
cannot function without the empathy
45
 that is necessary for the prediction of consequences of 
an intentional action directed at the wellbeing (interests) of the receiver as well as for the very 
detection of intentionality and thus for the attribution of responsibility for an action. Empathy 
evolved independently in at least three lineages of highly social and intelligent mammals, that 
is, in elephants, dolphins, and hominids
46
. These mammals can be motivated by the visible 
suffering of companions and sometimes subjects from other species to help them, especially 
by supporting and feeding. Empathy may have a significant motivational power in some 
people, although it can be switched off for outsiders in both humans
47
 and chimps
48
. Empathy 
appears in human infants at the age of just above one year, long before the onset of moral 
agency, and motivates their attempts to help, as it does in chimpanzees of a corresponding 
age
49
.  
A major cognitive faculty that is necessary for the work of moral agency is the 
attribution  of responsibility, that is, the identification of one’s own or someone else’s 
(intentional) action as the cause of its impact (as experienced empathically or directly) on 
another subject’s wellbeing (interests). This very definition implies that attribution of 
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responsibility depends on the understanding of causality, both of agent causation and event 
causation
50
, and on reflective self-consciousness. The understanding of (ultimately 
psychological) agent causation is necessary for realizing that an action is the result of an 
intention, and that of event causation for realizing that the observed state of the receiver is an 
outcome of the action. However, in order to know that one’s intention is the cause of one’s 
action, one has to be capable of looking upon oneself as an agent or actor, hence reflective 
self-consciousness is necessary for the attribution of responsibility for that action. The 
recognition of oneself as an agent is in turn necessary for the recognition of others’ agency, 
that is, for the recognition that their intentions lead to their actions. Both cognitive faculties 
that are necessary for responsibility attribution are met by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) who 
display at least the self-attribution of responsibility for bite wounds that they attempt to close 
as a gesture of reconciliation
51
. 
It is by now well established that chimpanzees use moral agency to enforce reciprocity 
as revealed by their moralizing aggression for betrayal in an alliance and rewarding former 
benefactors
52
. In terms of moral development (Table 1), chimpanzees meet the criteria of at 
least stage 2, i.e., of pragmatic exchanges
53
 although some chimpanzees, especially males 
who benefit from and may promote their good reputation among females, may in fact 
approach stage 3. As in human children, chimpanzee morality, or protomorality according to 
Haidt
54
, seems to function in dyads as there are no observations of norm enforcement by a 
third party. A pronounced sense of “egocentric fairness” has recently been demonstrated in 
capuchins (Cebus apella)
55
 who are more likely to share food with those who helped secure it 
before. They learn to exchange tokens for food and show a strong negative emotional 
reaction, stronger than frustration evoked by not being given expected food, when given less 
than what a neighbour obtained for the same token
56
. 
Most probably more primate species will show at least some elements of moral 
agency. The evolutionary appearance of moral agency among primates turns out to be not 
unexpected as primates tend to be relatively fair toward their fellows within a group, in 
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particular they respect the possession of items, especially of food. Rather than simply taking 
away a food item from a subordinate, a dominant individual has to ask for it, hence the 
common habit of (voluntary) food sharing that may promote the sense of fairness. 
Moral agency is a complex, possibly the most complex, motivational system that could 
not arise at once and evolved by the assembly of empathy, sense of fairness and attribution of 
responsibility, each of these mechanisms (or psychological modules) having an adaptive value 
of its own. The evolved combination of many affective and cognitive mechanisms of moral 
agency is reflected in the mosaic of brain centres involved in the generation of moral 
judgement
57
. It is no surprise that there is no single moral module that distinguishes Homo 
sapiens. 
 
THE ETHICAL STATUS OF MORALITY 
The most important ethical consequence that follows from the increasing 
understanding of moral agency as a product of evolution is that every received morality is 
ethically flawed, none can be taken as a paragon of goodness, and each needs corrections by 
science-informed ethics. 
The major flaw of moral agency is its in-group orientation. It evolved for the 
enhancement of cooperation and reduction of conflicts between group members rather than 
the promotion of universal good. The flip side of the adaptation to promote intra-group loyalty 
reveals the most tragic aspect of natural, received moralities, that is, the discrimination against 
out-group members, which is obviously conducive to intergroup conflicts. The greater the 
threat of a conflict, the more important intra-group loyalty and discrimination of potential 
enemies. “And so, the profound irony is that our noblest achievement – morality – has 
evolutionary ties to our basest behavior – warfare”58. 
Reciprocity as the organizing principle of every evolved morality makes it more or 
less pragmatic and contractarian rather than intrinsically good. It may well be that it pays off 
to obey your own moral agency, at least on average
59
. Leaving aside the discussion of 
contractarian ethics, the pragmatic orientation of evolved morals may be responsible for the 
common underestimation of the harms of omission (inaction) compared to the harms of action 
when, e.g., a few deaths caused by a vaccine are perceived as worse than many more deaths 
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resulting from the failure to approve a vaccine
60
. This may well be because an omission tends 
to be less threatened with retribution than an action.  
The potential for the manipulation of specifically human moral agency lies in the 
reciprocal exchange with imaginary persons who may request (via their earthly proxies, of 
course) essentially anything, leading some populations to self-destruction
61
 and some to 
prosperity depending on the pragmatic rather than ethical value of the imposed standards. 
Even if some religious standards work well for the community of believers it does not mean 
that they are universally good. 
Taking morality as intrinsically good and thus moral agents as categorically superior 
to other subjects proves to be wrong from the combined perspective of science and logic. As 
Peter Singer stated “if moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it 
is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force”62. As with any other 
outcome of evolution, every received morality needs ethical corrections, and accepting it as a 
paragon of what should be (the assumption called moralistic fallacy) leads in fact to another 
case of naturalistic fallacy. 
To conclude with a broader outlook, Darwin gave us a worldview that is both 
scientific and ethical as it is based on the understanding of the living world including its 
values that only recently, in the geological time scale, have come to be traded by moral 
agents. In the evolutionary perspective, the most fundamental subdivision of the living world 
is into living objects, that is, mere (even if beautiful and fascinating) devices for self-
replication, and living subjects, that is, sentient beings who, by definition, have individual 
interests. There is plenty of senseless suffering (experiential badness) but also of joy and 
excitement (experiential goodness) in the entire subjective world – whether human or not – 
and each deserves attention and respect of moral agents capable of genuine ethical reflection 
even though each in a different way. Subjective life generated moral agency that seems good 
for the here and now within a group but, as human history shows, does not seem to improve 
the balance of primary, experiential good and bad because of intergroup conflicts and 
parasitic ideologies. This balance can be, and at least in human affairs seems to be, improved 
by universalizing ethics that can evaluate every received morality with reference to genuine 
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and thus ultimately experiential values
63
, but certainly not by applying instead religious 
injunctions that are themselves subject to ethical scrutiny, and the rejection of some of them is 
long overdue.
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Table 1. Development of moral judgement, a simplified outline based on the work by L. 
Kohlberg and J.C. Gibbs.
64
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard development 
Immature (preconventional) stages: egocentrism, no consideration of the group/society. 
[Preschool and early school age.]. 
Stage 1 – Obedience to what is big and strong to avoid punishment and be rewarded. 
Following momentary desires. 
Stage 2 –  Pragmatic exchanges that have to be fair. Perspective taking in dyads: do for 
another if she/he did or will do it for you. [Probably the final stage for most chimpanzees. 
Also capuchins show the sense of egocentric fairness] 
Mature (conventional) stages: taking a third party perspective and applying the Golden Rule 
within one’s social environment: How would you wish to be treated by others? [Constructed 
during late childhood or early teenage through adolescence. Final for the majority of humans.] 
Stage 3 – Mutualities or ideal (principled) reciprocity: building good interpersonal 
relationships and trust. 
Stadium 4 – Law and order: systemic application of reciprocity through obeying rules, 
fulfilling one’s duties, and respecting authority. 
Existential (postconventional) development 
Meta-ethical reflection, justification and/or revision of received norms [Develops only is 
some humans, from adolescence on.] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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